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Over the last three decades, the landmark transformation of central banks from 
secrecy to openness and transparency has significantly enhanced their performance to 
successfully anchor inflation expectations and achieve price stability. The extent of such 
a transformation of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP),  especially in terms of statutory 
objectives, monetary policy mandate, conflicts of interest, disclosures, and dissemination 
of effective public economic information is assessed vis-à-vis the current popular central 
banking practices. The assessment indicates that the SBP is yet to be transformed to be 
able to achieve price stability which is a cornerstone for the achievement of sustainable 
economic growth. On the statutory front, such a transformation requires amending the 
SBP Act 1956, in line with the statutes for the best monetary policy frameworks by; (1) 
making price stability as the overriding objective of the SBP; (2) putting in place a clear 
mechanism for its accountability against price stability, consistent inflation targets, and; 
(3) elimination of the cushion for government‘s involvement with the monetary policy 
decision making processes. Some of the other areas like, institutional capacity building of 
the SBP, in terms of the relevance and level of the academic qualification, research 
profiles, and experiences of the Board, higher as well as lower tier management need 
special attention. Such transformations may not only enhance assimilation, creation, 
sharing, and funnelling of existing as well as new knowledge into monetary policy 
formulation, but may help change the static mindset at the SBP, hence allowing the 
institution to flourish.  
JEL Classification: E5, E52, E58 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The role of transparency in terms of a monetary policy decision making process 
and communication has been increasingly recognised, as an important component of the 
best central banking practices [Blinder, et al. (2008); Winkler (2002) and Fry, et al. 
(2000)]. The leading central banks such as the Federal Reserve (Fed), European Central 
Bank (ECB), and largely the inflation targeters including the developing countries have 
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transformed into more open and informative central banks, since 1990s instead of being 
secretive until the 1980s.
1
 
 Motivation for this transformation from a secretive to a more communicative 
approach hinges on the non-trivial benefits—the transparency and effective 
communications confer. For instance, it allows the central banks to anchor inflation 
expectations more effectively [Geraats (2005)] and reduces uncertainty both from the 
perspective of financial and public markets. [Geraat (2007)]. It enhances 
predictability [see Swanson (2004) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004)] and enables 
economic agents to plan and take rational decisions. It also facilitates central bank‘s 
accountability, thereby paving the way for an increased central bank independence. 
This in turn helps to improve the quality of a central bank‘s own functioning through 
credibility build-up [Winkler (2002)]. Thus, by and large, the increased emphasis on 
transparency and communication has led the central banks to open up and 
communicate with clarity and precision, particularly in terms of their objectives, 
mandate, disclosures, and appropriate dissemination of public economic information. 
To what extent has the SBP progressed on these lines is an open question? 
It is however pertinent to mention that although, some of the studies have 
evaluated the transparency and performance of Pakistan‘s monetary policy, none of 
them attempted to critically highlight the fundamental issues—related to the SBP‘s 
monetary policy statutory framework, decision making, the conflicts of interest, 
disclosures, and dissemination of public economic information with possible 
implications for the SBP‘s credibility and effective communication. For instance, 
Malik and Din (2008) attempted to assess the SBP‘s monetary policy, while 
evaluating its transparency against the scores given in Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). 
Ahmed and Malik (2011) have also attempted to assess the SBP‘s monetary policy 
performance by using counterfactual simulations. They employed a simple Taylor 
rule and concluded: had the SBP followed a rule, its performance would have been 
better. Hayat (2014a) empirically assessed the SBP‘s monetary policy performance 
for a period of 50-years from 1961–2010, with a focus on the evaluation of the 
discretion granted to the SBP for the achievement of its dual objectives, inflation, 
and growth. He found robust evidence that by exercising their discretion, the 
monetary policy makers at the SBP created excessive inflationary pressures in the 
economy that harmed the real growth for 62 percent of the time—hence, defeating 
both of its key objectives of inflation, and real growth.  
Given this backdrop, the current paper intends to critically assess the SBP‘s 
monetary policy, while drawing on some fundamental issues largely from a statutory 
perspective with implications for the SBP‘s credibility and effective conduct of the 
monetary policy. Since there is no standard pattern of central banking practices that can 
be used as a benchmark for the underlying assessment, this paper mainly relies on the 
prevailing practices of leading central banks, as well as inflation targeters as a reference 
point. To fill the gap, the remainder of this paper is structured into the following sections. 
Section 2 critically discusses the statutory objectives in the SBP Act, 1956 which is set 
 
1For instance, the Fed in the 1970s was sued to give the first written defence for its secretive behaviour. 
The seminal paper of Goodfriend (1985) provides a detailed exposition of the case, the defence of the Fed for 
the secrecy and the weaknesses therein.  
 Pakistan’s Monetary Policy  33 
out for the SBP and elicit the problems therein that hinders its effective performance of 
monetary policy. Section 3 highlights the SBP‘s issues pertaining to the statutory 
monetary policy mandate, its potential both as a monetary policy guiding framework, as 
well as a design for its performance evaluation and accountability. Section 4 delves into 
the potential conflicts of interest originating from the dual supervisory and monetary 
policy role of the SBP, fiscal dominance, and the Board‘s market affiliations that might 
hinder the effective conduct of the monetary policy. Section 5 focuses on the disclosures 
of the profiles, minutes and voting records of the Board and assesses the efficacy of the 
SBP‘s performance in terms of dissemination of public economic information—
especially forecasts, Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) and major publications. The last 
section concludes the paper. 
 
2.  STATUTORY OBJECTIVES 
In case of Pakistan, Section 9A of the SBP Act (1956) vests the responsibility of 
the conduct of monetary policy with the SBP‘s apex body in these words: 
The Central Board, in order to secure monetary stability and soundness of the 
financial system—(a) formulate and monitor monetary and credit policy and, in 
determining the expansion of liquidity, take into account the Federal 
Government‘s targets for growth and inflation, and ensure that the Bank 
conducts monetary and credit policy in a manner consistent with these 
targets….. p. 10.2 
The wording of the Act implies that essentially the SBP has dual objectives, 
i.e. inflation and growth. The government sets annual inflation and growth targets 
each year, and as per the statute the SBP is supposed to actively pursue it. Majority 
of the countries abandoned this kind of a framework back in the 1990s. The central 
banks no longer actively pursue ambitious growth targets such as the ones set by the 
Government of Pakistan (to be discussed in the next subsection). This transformation 
occurred largely on the back of the seminal research of Kydland and Prescott (1977) . 
Hundreds of studies also [see Gartner (2000)] reveal that a central banker, who 
actively pursues the real growth in the long-term, ends up creating excessive inflation 
in the economy without any significant output gains. Another strand of literature 
shows that money is neutral in the long-run [see Weber (1994); Lucas (1995); 
Apostolos and Koustas (1998) and Bullard (1999)], which implies, creation of high 
average inflation without any corresponding long-term growth gain. To this effect, 
Hayat (2014d), while using the data from Pakistan for the period i.e. 1961–2010 
found empirical evidence that monetary neutrality holds. 
The maintenance of the status quo of the SBP Act regarding the duality of 
inflation, and growth targets even in the wake of the second decade of the twenty-first 
century is naïve. Active pursuit of dual mandate was not surprising until the 1960s, 
because prior to that the central banks were believed to be able to fetch higher growth 
 
2It is imperative to mention that the SBP is expected to take care of other objectives such as exchange 
rate and financial stability, however these are neither clearly defined as to exactly what they constitute nor there 
exist quantitative targets for such objectives. Therefore, the main focus in this section is on the SBP‘s dual 
objectives of inflation and growth, and the issues emerging from their numerical targets. 
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rates by accepting relatively higher inflation—a phenomenon commonly referred to as 
the Phillips Curve. However, lately the world has learnt that the Phillips Curve became 
less steep in the 1970s and flat in the 1980s. Later in the 1990s, overwhelming evidence 
has been found that higher average inflation, instead affects the real growth adversely 
[Barro (1995); Ireland (1999)]. Thus, in light of the new knowledge, the focus of many 
central banks—irrespective of the underlying form of monetary policy strategy, whether 
inflation targeting or otherwise—shifted towards price stability. It helps in attaining a 
sustainable possible level of real growth without affecting the society adversely. Part of 
the change is also an acknowledgement of the knowledge that real growth is a function of 
a range of other factors beyond the control of the central banks, such as initial 
endowments, human capital, research and development, law and order, and so forth [see 
Levine and Renelt (1992); Barro (1995-96)]. 
Amidst these developments, the Government of Pakistan continues to stick to 
the outdated tenets of the SBP Act and sets the inflation, and growth targets in a way, 
where it is hard to find any fundamental economic theory or a standard central 
banking practice that may lend support to the naivety in these targets. Based on the 
government‘s assigned inflation and growth targets, the chances of formulation of an 
effective monetary policy are remote. Instead of providing any guiding framework, 
these targets essentially misguide the SBP and its monetary policy. The discussion of 
issues associated with individual inflation and growth targets as well as with their 
combination follows.  
 
2.1. The Government’s Assigned Growth Targets 
The government‘s assignment of growth targets to the SBP and the latter‘s 
subsequent pursuit for its achievement potentially induces inflation bias. As was argued 
by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a, b) that inflation bias 
results from the monetary policy makers‘ temptation to spur the real growth beyond its 
potential without any output gains. Since, the Government of Pakistan generally sets 
the real growth targets, beyond the potential rate of the economy (Figure 1), attempts 
on part of the SBP for its achievement that leads to the creation of undesirable excess 
inflation in the economy.
3
 
For example, Hayat (2014a) found empirical evidence that the SBP induced 
excess inflationary pressures in the economy, which hindered real growth for around 
62 percent of the 50 years from 1961–2010. This inflation bias over the period has 
resulted in undermining the SBP‘s credibility and effective conduct of monetary 
policy. Surico (2008) noted that in the case of the U.S., the Fed did tolerate even 1 
percent inflation bias  in the pre-1979 era, which they simultaneously eliminated by 
bringing inflation close to the 2 percent level. Whereas in case of Pakistan, Hayat 
(2014b) asserted that eight times higher average inflation bias than that of the U.S. 
has not been able to prompt either the government or the SBP to take long-lasting 
serious remedial measures for its elimination. 
 
3The natural rate of the economy is extracted from real growth using HP filter by employing the penalty 
parameter  = 100, which is the recommended level for annual data. 
 Pakistan’s Monetary Policy  35 
Fig. 1.  Annual Growth Targets and Natural Rate of the Economy 
 
Source: Author‘s estimation and SBP Annual Reports. 
 
Given the limitations of monetary policy in terms of its ineffectiveness in stimulating 
the real growth, even the countries with dual mandate do not set any numerical growth or 
employment targets for the central banks. For example, in the case of the U.S. the statute 
requires the Fed to attain maximum possible employment, but unlike Pakistan, the 
government has no specific unemployment or growth targets, which the Fed is required by 
statutes to take into account, while formulating a monetary policy. Instead, the Fed 
maintains inflation at or close to 2 percent level, as in its view this rate allows the Fed to 
firmly anchor inflation expectations, which helps foster price stability and moderate long-
term interest rates. In turn, it enhances the Fed‘s ability to promote maximum employment. 
Unlike the SBP, the Fed clearly acknowledges that the maximum level of employment is 
largely determined by non-monetary factors. Since, these factors may change over time and 
may not be directly measurable; therefore neither the U.S. Government nor the Fed 
specifies any numerical targets for maximum employment or growth. 
Likewise, it may not be a beneficial practice in case of Pakistan to set binding 
numerical growth targets for the SBP, especially higher than the natural rate of the 
economy as shown in Figure 1, because it induces inflation bias without any growth-gain 
[Kydland and Prescott (1977)]. This is more likely due to the fact that non-monetary 
factors largely determine the growth beyond the direct control of a central bank. The SBP 
instead can pave the way for the achievement of a sustainable growth by ensuring ‗price 
stability‘.  
 
2.2. The Government’s Assigned Inflation Targets  
Quantitative inflation targets are set by the federal government each year. When 
observed over a horizon, these targets exhibit too high and erratic inflation rates to help 
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achieve short, medium or long-term price stability (Figure 2). The government inflation 
target-setting strategy is problematic from three perspectives.  
First, as a starting point, a default inflation bias element is induced on the part of 
the SBP by creating an implicit floor inflation rate. For instance, as is shown in Figure 2, 
in the last one and a half decades, by and large, the government has set the inflation 
targets far above than the 4 percent level. This implicit floor automatically biases the SBP 
towards inflation, as it does not have to be wary to bring it down below this level to 
stabilise it in a narrow price stability, consistent range from 1 percent–3 percent  in the 
medium to long-term. The price stability consistent inflation targets range in the Figure 2 
is depicted by the dashed lines, where the government did not set inflation target(s) even 
once,, which allows more room for undesirably high and volatile inflation. 
 
Fig. 2.  Government’s Assigned Annual Inflation Targets 
 
Source: SBP Annual Reports. 
 
These inflation targets seem to drive the behaviour of the SBP‘s monetary policy 
authorities. Hayat (2014d) observes the discretionary behaviour of Pakistan‘s monetary 
policy maker over a 50 year timeframe with the help of discretion indicator depicted in 
Figure 3. He notes that the turning points at the trough of the discretion indicator 
corresponds to a 4.4 percent observed inflation on average. He argues that this behaviour 
of the SBP for not allowing inflation roughly below 4 percent level is highly consistent 
with Cukierman‘s (2000) new inflation bias proposition—that such a central banker is 
wary that economy may sink into recession.  
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Fig. 3.  Time Plot of the Discretion Indicator 
 
Source: Hayat (2014d). 
 
Therefore, the government‘s high average numerical inflation targets coupled with 
the SBP‘s active pursuit of higher than natural rate of the economy undermines its ability 
to successfully anchor inflation to the extent to maintain price stability. Since at times the 
inflation targets are set as high as 12 percent, the inflation expectations are naturally 
anchored accordingly at higher levels. In other words, when it is announced that inflation 
is expected to be 12 percent, how can public expect that inflation would be lower, say at  
6 percent? The inflation targets setting strategy of the government, thus potentially leads 
to a higher than equilibrium rate of inflation that is technically known as inflation bias.  
Second, a nontrivial complication arises due to the government‘s naïve inflation 
targets as shown in Figure 2, in the sense that it is not possible to adjust monetary policy 
in response to such erratic inflation targets each year, and expect them being achieved; 
especially owing to the established fact that monetary policy actions takes effect with a 
lag [Friedman (1968); Havranek and Rusnak (2013)]. For argument sake, assuming even 
if no lags were involved in monetary policy, a perfect achievement of the government 
assigned inflation targets would instead have derailed the economy from the path of price 
stability. For example, average of the inflation targets for a 14 year period in Figure 2 is 
7.32 percent and its variance is 6.98 percent, which is highly inconsistent with the 
standard definition of ‗price stability‘.4 Normally 2 percent inflation rate is considered 
consistent with the notion of price stability. For example, in the case of the U.S., the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)‘s mandate-consistent inflation rate is generally 
judged to be about 2 percent or a bit below. Similarly, price stability is defined as a year-
on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the Euro Area 
of below 2 percent by the ECB. Further, the inflation targeters (both develop and 
 
4Price stability refers to a state of the economy characterised by low inflation and a stable value of 
money. 
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developing countries) largely targets inflation in a range of 1 percent–3 percent. Thus for 
the attainment of price stability, the dashed lines in Figure 2 indicate that the inflation 
rates in Pakistan will have to be contained in the 1 percent–3 percent range.  
Third, given the government inflation targets-setting strategy, unlike other 
countries, the SBP may neither be made accountable for the maintenance of price 
stability, nor its inflation performance can be evaluated. As a result, it is not possible for 
the SBP to build its credibility to anchor inflation expectations at lower levels, because it 
cannot send non-noisy signals of commitment to a low and stable inflation rate over 
medium and long-term. Since the public, especially the private sector is rational; they do 
understand the inherent flaws in the overall monetary policy framework and therefore 
adjust their expectations accordingly.
5
 Thus given the current monetary policy 
framework, the SBP may not successfully delink the inflation expectations of the public 
from high and erratic inflation rates. Therefore, like the central banks in other advanced 
and inflation targeting countries, if the SBP has to be made accountable, while putting in 
place a mechanism for its performance evaluation, the government will have to set 
appropriate inflation targets in a short to medium term. 
Precisely, the government should set the inflation targets close to 2 percent with a 
plus/minus 1 percent band to allow for a cushion to deal with unforeseen supply side 
shocks to the economy.
6
 Debelle (1999) notes that an inflation band allows a reasonable 
cushion with the central banker to deal with shocks to the economy. The better inflation 
and growth performance of the inflation targeting countries in the wake of recent 
financial crisis provides anecdotal evidence to this effect. Another possible cushion with 
the central bank to deal with the shocks could be the targeting of core inflation, which 
excludes the effects of food and supply side shocks, hence easing off to an extent the 
strict accountability. 
Therefore, if the government sets inflation targets for the SBP in 1 percent–3 
percent range, it will (i) significantly enhance the real growth [Hayat (2014a)], (ii) pave 
the way for the achievement of price stability, (iii) provide a framework for the SBP‘s 
accountability and its performance evaluation, (iv) help the SBP build inflation fighting 
credibility, and (v) would make the SBP‘s communication with the private and public 
sectors easier and effective to yield the maximum possible monetary policy benefits. 
 
2.3. The Inflation-growth Targets Nexus 
As indicated earlier, in case of Pakistan, the government sets numerical inflation 
and growth targets on annual basis and the statutes [SBP Act (1956)] makes it obligatory 
for the monetary authorities to duly consider these targets in formulation of monetary 
 
5There is a wide consensus on the point that the public is rational as has been modelled by majority of 
the theoretical models such as Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Barro and Gordon (1983). Moreover, Hayat 
(2014c) and Abbas, et al. (2015) found some empirical evidence about the rational expectations behaviour of 
the public in Pakistan. 
6Almost all the advanced countries‘ central banks set their inflation targets around two percent [Romer 
and Romer (2002)], as this rate is consistent with ‗price stability‘ and even allows a sufficient cushion to 
trivialise zero lower bound in a world of small shocks [Blanchard, et al. (2010)]. Surico (2008) estimated a bias 
of 1 percent in the case of the U.S. for pre-1979 policy regime, and noted that inflation bias disappears when the 
inflation target is close to 2 percent. Hayat (2014b) using data from Pakistan found that inflation exceeding 2 
percent level significantly constitute inflation bias. 
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policy. This framework is also problematic not only owing to the issues emerging from 
the individual inflation and growth targets, but also from a combination thereof in a 
particular year, or over a period of time. To understand, how such combinations are 
senseless, it is imperative to briefly highlight the literature on the inflation-growth nexus 
to be able to relate it to the government‘s inflation and growth targets mix. 
The relationship between inflation and growth is far from straightforward. For 
example, up till the mid 1970s, the Phillips Curve (positive relationship between inflation 
and growth) was popular, while the empirical evidence in the 1990s suggests a negative 
relationship [see for example, De Gregario (1992-93); Barro (1995) and Ireland (1999)]. 
One of the aspects of empirical evidence in the 1990s and 2000s, suggest a nonlinear 
relationship between inflation and growth [see for example, Fischer (1993); Sarel (1996) 
and Khan and Senhadji (2001)]. Divergence in the long and short-term effects of inflation 
on real growth is yet another dimension. For example, long-term inflation is believed to 
be negatively affecting growth, however in the short-run, monetary policy can be used to 
stabilise shocks to the real economy, which suggests a short-term positive relationship 
between the two. 
Nevertheless, as can be seen from Figure 4, the government‘s assigned inflation 
and growth targets neither follow a consistent pattern, nor can guide monetary policy in a 
particular direction. These targets do not depict any consistent relationship that can be 
related to or inferred from the literature on inflation growth nexus evolved over time—a 
positive relationship of the 1960s and a negative (or) a non-linear relationship on-ward. 
Naïve combinations of inflation and growth targets on annual basis in the existing fashion 
hamper the conduct of monetary policy in an appropriate manner. It does not allow an 
effective and beneficial conduct of monetary policy, because of the unavailability of any 
underlying fundamental economic theory or practice.  
 
Fig. 4.  Combination of Government’s Annual Inflation and Growth Targets 
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As highlighted earlier, the government‘s individual inflation targets does not 
provide an appropriate benchmark for the SBP‘s performance evaluation, a mechanism 
for its accountability on its basis therefore may not be designed. Similar is the case when 
combination(s) of inflation and growth targets at different points is considered. For 
example, a combination of divergent inflation and growth targets like that of Pakistan 
may not be achieved simultaneously on a period by period basis, especially, when there is 
a conflict between the achievements of the two. 
Therefore, as a starting point, the fundamental flaws in government‘s inflation 
and growth targets-setting strategy need to be addressed. Indeed, the best way to do it 
is to set inflation targets in price stability consistent range of 1 percent–3 percent, 
while making the SBP strictly accountable for its achievement. As far as the growth 
side is concerned, the government may set growth targets for its own guidance . 
However, the SBP may not be required to take these into account due to monetary 
policy in effectiveness in terms of real growth [see Hayat (2014d) for empirical 
evidence on long-term monetary neutrality].
7
 Nonetheless, like other central banks, 
the SBP may play its part to stabilise short-term shocks to the real economy, as long 
as the inflation stays within the price stability range and only that monetary policy 
intervention is deemed effective.  
This will help build the SBP‘s credibility and in turn it may communicate with the 
public and private sectors more effectively for the achievement of price stability. 
However, all this would require amending the SBP Act to make price stability as the 
prime objective of the SBP, while holding it accountable for its achievement. Setting 
numerical inflation targets around price stability consistent rate of 2 percent from 
medium to long-term, could be an optimal strategy to help achieve both inflation and 
growth stability.  
 
3.  MONETARY POLICY DECISION MAKING 
Section 9.1 of the SBP Act (1956, p.9) constitute that: 
The general superintendence and direction of the affairs and business of the Bank 
shall be entrusted to the Central Board of Directors, which may exercise all the 
powers and do all the acts and things that may be exercised or done by the Bank, 
and are not by this Act expressly directed or required to be done by the Bank in 
general meeting or annual general meeting.  
One may clearly infer from the aforementioned statutes that the Central Board has 
been empowered hugely concerning the SBP‘s affairs. In light of the powers conferred 
via the Act, the Board is mandated to conduct the monetary policy, which is critically 
discussed in the proceeding sub-sections. 
 
3.1. Mandate for Monetary Policy and SBP’s Performance Evaluation 
In case of Pakistan, Section 9A of the SBP Act (1956) vests the responsibility 
of the conduct of monetary policy with the Central Board to secure ‗monetary 
 
7It is important to note that in practice central banks maintain clarity about inflation targets, whereas 
remain opaque about growth targets [Geraats (2006)]. 
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stability and soundness of the financial system‘.8 The Board is undertaking multiple 
tasks, for example taking decisions related to the compensation packages of the staff, 
leave and promotion policies, budget approvals and so forth.  Whether, it is the best 
practice for the SBP Board to spent time on such a huge portfolio, along with a 
highly specialised and demanding responsibility of the conduct of the monetary 
policy?  In case of the Bank of England (BoE), such functions other than the 
monetary policy are instead, performed by the Court of Directors (composed of nine 
non-executive directors) appointed directly by the Crown. The court delegates day to 
day management of the bank to the governor and through him to other members of 
the executive, but reserves itself the right to agree on: the bank‘s strategy and 
objectives, expenditure budget, major capital projects, financial framework, risk 
management policies, approval of the accounts and the appointment of auditors . 
Also, the remit for management of the BoE‘s balance sheet, senior appointments 
within the bank, changes in remuneration and pension arrangements, the bank‘s 
succession plan, the establishment of sub-committees of the court, their terms of 
reference, and membership. The court keeps its procedures under close review and 
each year an annual effectiveness review is conducted on which a report is made to  
the court. 
Further, in the case of the BoE, the Oversight Committee (a sub-committee of 
the Court) regularly reviews the performance of the BoE in relation to its objectives 
and strategy such as monetary policy objective, the financial stability objective, and 
any other objectives set by the court. Should there be such a practice of independent 
evaluation of the SBP‘s performance in terms of its objectives by a specialist body 
other than the Board is an open question. This needs a thorough intellectual debate 
on the appropriateness of the scope of the SBP Board given their capacity (see Sub-
Section 3.3), formulation of any other independent specialist bodies and sub-
committees, thereof in light of the best practices to ensure efficient and effective 
performance of the SBP‘s portfolio.  
 
3.2. Issues with Monetary Stability as a Guiding Framework for Monetary Policy  
Generally the central banks are given a certain mandate, predominantly price stability. 
Nevertheless, in some cases the mandate may be dual. For instance, in the case of the U.S., the 
Fed is mandated for price stability and maximum employment by statute. It is reiterated that 
the government do not quantify such a mandate,  instead the FOMC considers 2 percent 
inflation as price stability consistent inflation rate, which in their view provides an enabling 
environment for the achievement of maximum employment in addition to other factors 
beyond its control. Therefore, the Fed despite being discretionary, in terms of duality of 
objectives has a clear inflation path to follow, the path of price stability. 
Unlike the U.S., in case of Pakistan, the wording of the SBP Act when examined 
carefully, does not allow an appropriate path for the conduct of monetary policy. For 
example, the SBP Act (1956, p.10) says that: 
 
8The Central Board of Directors (also referred to as the ‗Board‘) consist of the (i) the SBP Governor, 
(ii) Secretary, Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, and (iii) eight directors (at-least one from each 
province).   
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The Central Board, in order to secure monetary stability and soundness of the 
financial system—(a) formulate and monitor monetary and credit policy and, in 
determining the expansion of liquidity, take into account the Federal Government‘s 
targets for growth and inflation and ensure that the Bank conducts monetary and 
credit policy in a manner consistent with these targets…... 
Thus, the statutes guides that primarily the SBP should aim at ‗monetary stability‘ 
and ‗soundness of financial system‘.9 In order to assess if the Act provides a basic 
guiding framework for the monetary policy, a logical question arises that should 
‗monetary stability‘ be the prime objectives of the SBP‘s monetary policy instead of 
‗price stability‘? If the ultimate goal of the monetary policy is to improve the living 
standards of people, is monetary stability or price stability the best way to raise their 
standards in an equitable fashion? To understand which framework between the two can 
best guide the monetary policy, they are assessed one by one as follows. 
To start with, there is no tangible way to exactly define monetary stability for the 
purposes of monetary policy evaluation. Monetary stability is commonly referred to as 
the stability in prices, interest rate and exchange rate. Working with this definition, the 
main problem the existing framework poses is that it is hard to quantify monetary 
stability to provide an objective basis for conduct, evaluation and communication of 
monetary policy. Even if monetary stability is to be represented by stability in some 
measure of money, say growth in M2, then what is that particular growth rate or range of 
growth rates in M2 that would stabilise prices, interest rate and exchange rate at desirable 
levels? The flip side of the argument is that what are those unique rates in prices, interest 
rates and exchange rates that would help achieve monetary stability? 
Another way to observe, if the notion of monetary stability can guide monetary 
policy is to analyse the issue in the context of the SBP‘s historical approach, which 
nevertheless—from an operational perspective—has been discontinued since August, 
2009 after adopting the interest corridor system. The SBP used to set M2 targets 
consistent with the government‘s inflation and growth targets. Qayyum (2008) noted that 
if for example the government‘s targets for inflation and growth in a particular year are 
say 8 percent and 5 percent, respectively, the M2 targets would work out to be the sum of 
both the targets, which in this case would be 13 percent. Let‘s see if such a framework 
may help achieve monetary stability.  
Figure 5 depicts the SBP‘s targets for growth in M2 along with the actual. Two 
observations are important. First, these targets per se;  even if achieved 100 percent, may 
not represent monetary stability in anyway—as the spread of these targets is quite large 
ranging from 9 percent to 14 percent. Second, the volatility of the actual growth in M2 is 
very high—23 percent in terms of variance—to be deemed consistent with the notion of 
monetary stability. It therefore may not (1) induce any stability in the variables such as 
inflation, interest rates and exchange rates, (2) it is hard to be communicated to the public 
as it would not make any sense to them, and (3) it cannot be used as a benchmark for the 
purposes of monetary policy evaluation and accountability.  
 
9See Sub-section 4.1 for a discussion on potential conflict of interest that may arise due to the 
supervisory role of a central bank. 
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Fig. 5.  Historical Performance of the SBP in Terms of the Statutory  
Monetary Stability Mandate 
 
 
On the contrary to the SBP statute regarding monetary stability and soundness of 
financial system, a widely acknowledged and popularly practiced notion is that of ‗price 
stability‘, as it helps raise the standards of living of the people. Price stability allows an 
economic system to operate more efficiently, while producing higher levels of output and 
rapid economic growth, [Mishkin (1997)] hence raising the standards of living of the 
society. Conversely, the absence of price stability generates high costs to society. These 
costs may be diverse, ranging from the ‗shoe leather‘ costs [Bailey (1956)] to the loss of 
output [Groshen and Schweitzer (1996)].
10
 Considerable work of both theoretical and an 
empirical nature has been done, either to justify the importance of price stability, or to 
highlight the costs associated with price instability [see Fischer and Modigliani (1975); 
Fischer (1981); Briault (1995); Hatch, et al. (1998) and Mishkin (2006)]. Indeed this is 
why the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Act (1989, p. 27), unambiguously put it 
in the words that ―the primary function of the Bank is to formulate and implement 
monetary policy directed to the economic objective of achieving and maintaining stability 
in the general level of prices‖. 
On the back of the aforecited literature and practice, let‘s consider if the price 
stability in contrast to the existing monetary stability framework allows an objective basis 
for conduct, evaluation and communication of the monetary policy. As discussed earlier 
in Sub-section 2.2, that price stability is generally quantified in terms of inflation rate at 
or close to 2 percent. Hence, this is easily communicated to the public and at the same 
time, it allows a benchmark for monetary policy evaluation and accountability.
11
 Since 
 
10Also see English (1996) for the shift of resources from productive use to non-productive use due to 
inflation. 
11It may be noted that there may be a slight difference in the practice, for example some countries may 
consider a range of inflation say from 1 percent to 3 percent as appropriate for achieving price stability. The 
issues related to the choice of a particular indicator of inflation, i.e. headline or core inflation is beyond the 
scope of current paper.  
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price stability implies low variability in inflation, it in turn stabilises variations in the 
interest rate, exchange rate and money growth. The flip side is that the central banker 
should aim to stabilise interest rate, exchange rate and money growth at levels that ensure 
price stability. Therefore, the statutory primary goal of the SBP should be the 
achievement of price stability and the rest would automatically fell in place. 
 
3.2.  The Board and the Governor 
Section 9.2.C of the SBP Act (1956, p.9) confers the responsibility of running the 
affairs of the SBP business with the Board (including the governor), ―who shall be 
eminent professionals from the fields of economics, finance, banking and accountancy, to 
be appointed by the Federal Government‖. This covenant of the SBP Act to some extent 
appears consistent with theory, nevertheless, a brief discussion on the profiles of 
monetary authorities from other central banks as well as theory may help in inferring as   
to who such ‗professionals‘ should be?  
In order to draw some lessons from, a review of the profiles of some of the 
central bank‘s decision making bodies, explicitly indicate that their board members and 
the governors are eminent economists with impressive profiles, with the highest 
terminal degrees (PhDs) largely with relevant specialisation, and a wide range of 
research publications in high ranked international journals. For instance, in the case of 
the U.S., out of the 12 FOMC members, ten have completed their doctorates in 
Economics and also carry impressive research profiles in the field of monetary policy. 
Most of them are working as editors of esteemed economic journals and  honoured for 
their publications in the world‘s highest ranked journals. Moreover, two members of 
the FOMC are eminent law professionals who have been serving as editors of esteemed 
law journals.  
Similarly, taking an example of the developing economy like Turkey, all the 
members on their central bank board including governors have doctorates in Economics 
and have published research papers in highly ranked journals. Even in the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI) four out of the 10 Board members have PhDs with profound profiles in 
terms of their publications and relevant research. Again, the governor (chairman) of a 
central bank is normally an economist of a high repute. For instance, in the case of the 
U.S., historically there have been big names like Alan Greenspan, Ben Bernanke and so 
forth. On a similar note, even the current governor of the RBI has a renowned profile 
with impressive publications and is an internationally recognised figure in the relevant 
field. 
The theoretical literature on who should be granted the authority for the conduct of 
monetary policy can broadly take two forms that can practically be implemented. The 
first form is that of the incentive contract which is considered as an arrangement between 
the government and the central banker.
12
 Under such arrangements, the policy maker is 
given a target rate of inflation and is rewarded or punished on the basis of its 
achievement/non-achievement.  
 
12Incentive contracts are covered in Canzoneri (1985), Garfinkle and Oh (1993), Persson and Tabellini 
(1993) and Walsh (1993 b, 1995b). 
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Second is the delegation of the conduct of monetary policy authority to a weight-
conservative central banker.
13
 For instance, Rogoff (1985) proposed the delegation of 
monetary policy authority to an independent central banker who is inflation-averse. Such 
a central banker puts more weight on inflation and less on the output resulting in lower 
inflation bias, but the output variability may increase, especially when the supply shocks 
are large. Several studies extended the idea of delegation including Flood and Isard 
(1989); Person and Tabellini (1990, 1993); Alesina and Grilli (1991); Lohman (1992); 
Cukierman (1992) and Svensson (1997a). Romer and Romer (1997) added that the 
conduct of monetary policy should be delegated to knowledgeable persons who are adept 
in the evaluation and maximisation of social welfare. Such experts can better and faster 
incorporate the advances of knowledge in the monetary policy decision making process. 
Therefore, in most of the countries, the authority of the conduct of monetary policy has 
been delegated to high profile economists normally to inflation fighters, who in turn 
demonstrated greater performance in terms of ensuring price stability. For example, after 
the great inflation of the 1970s, almost all the advanced countries, inflation targeters and 
most of the emerging and developing economies have managed to bring down inflation 
rates to ‗price stability‘ consistent levels, and have successfully sustained them. 
Thus, the world has learnt that vesting the responsibility of the conduct of 
monetary policy with eminent professionals, especially the ‗hawks‘ instead of ‗doves‘ 
have yielded beneficial results. Such results can be witnessed in terms of a reduction in 
inflation persistence [see Siklos (1999); Kuttner and Posen (1999-2001); King (2002) and 
Petursson (2005)], a reduction in inflation variability [Levin, et al. (2004); Lin and Ye 
(2009)], a reduction in inflation expectations [Johnson (2002)]. Similarly see Corbo, et al. 
(2001); Neuman and Von Hagen (2002); Levin, et al. (2004) and Peturson (2005) for a 
reduction in growth variability. 
In view of the above, it is imperative for the Government of Pakistan to implement 
the relevant clause (in the SBP Act) in letter and spirit, regarding the delegation of the 
conduct of the monetary policy. It should be delegated to ‗hawks‘ rather than ‗doves‘ 
with terminal qualifications in Economics, preferably with specialisation in monetary 
policy along with a demonstrated research excellence and international exposure. This 
will greatly help improve the monetary policy practices at the SBP and hence its 
performance, and credibility to yield desirable results. 
 
4.  THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
There are three major areas of Pakistan‘s monetary policy design, where potentially the 
conflict of interest issue may arise at different levels from different perspectives. Its‘ 
identification and discussion is nontrivial in the sense that it does affect the performance and 
the credibility of the SBP in conduct of monetary policy. First, the conflict of interest that 
originates due to the supervisory role of the SBP. Second, the conflict of interest that arises 
due to the explicit role of the government representatives in the affairs of monetary policy. 
Third, the conflict of interest that emanates from the market affiliation of the monetary policy 
decision makers. In any form, the conflict of interest is not deemed desirable, as it potentially 
risks the appropriate conduct of monetary policy.  
 
13A weight-conservative central banker is the one who gives more weight to inflation as compared to 
output in the conduct of monetary policy. 
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4.1.  The Conflict of Interest Due to the Supervisory Role of the SBP 
Since 1990s, there has been a debate on the conflict of interest arising from the 
duality of the monetary policy and supervisory objectives of a central bank [Whelan 
(2012)]. The main theme emerges from the argument that the conflict of interest between 
the monetary policy, and the regulation of the banking sector may lead to inflation bias 
[see Noia and Giorgio (1999); Lim, et al. (2012)]. The idea is that a central bank will 
remain flexible on the inflation objective if it fears that tight monetary policy may affect 
the profitability and soundness of the banking sector [Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993-
95)]. Although, the debate is yet to reach to a conclusion, it is important to take into 
account, the potential inflation bias implications for higher average inflation in Pakistan 
as the SBP is also responsible for financial stability i.e., ―The Central Board shall, in 
order to secure monetary stability and soundness of the financial system…‖ [SBP Act 
(1956)]. In case of a conflict between the inflation objective and financial stability, if the 
SBP chose to be flexible on the former, it may render its inflation fighting credibility 
tenuous, and in turn any communication to contain inflation would potentially be 
ineffective. As a solution to this problem, Blinder (2010) suggests that a central bank 
should rationally balance these competing objectives and who else other than the central 
bank can best do the job. 
Since, there are divergent views as to whether the central bank should have both the 
monetary policy and supervisory objectives, the practice also varies. For example, in the case 
of the BoE, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) is a separate body with distinct 
objectives from the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).
14
 Consistent with public law, its 
regulatory decision-making is rigorous and well documented, and its Board take the decisions 
while comprising the governor of the BoE, the deputy governors for financial stability and 
markets and banking, the chief executive officer of the PRA, and the independent non-
executive members of the Board. The PRA Board is involved in the most important decisions 
on general policy and individual cases. Like the MPC, it is also accountable to the parliament. 
It is important to mention that the MPC in contrast to the PRA Board constitutes nine 
members including the governor, the three deputy governors, the bank‘s chief economist, and 
four external members appointed directly by the Chancellor. The appointment of independent 
members is designed to ensure that the MPC benefits from thinking and expertise in addition 
to what has developed in the BoE. Therefore, by construct, the room for the conflict of interest 
between monetary policy and banking supervision is minimised, because in the case of the 
MPC all the members have the right to vote. 
On the contrary, in the case of the U.S., the supervisory role of the Fed is vested 
with the seven members Board of Governors, whereas the Fed‘s monetary policy 
decision making authority is the FOMC, which adds five non-voting Reserve Bank 
presidents to the Board of Governors. Although, these presidents attend the meetings, 
participate in the discussions, and contribute to the Committee‘s assessment of the 
economy, and policy options, they do not have the right to vote. Therefore, effectively the 
BoE is more insulated from the conflict of interest issue as compared to the U.S., as in the 
latter case, essentially the Board of Governors take the decisions both for monetary 
policy as well as for regulation. 
 
14 It may be noted that PRA, although part of the BoE is the prudential regulator for deposit-takers, 
insurance companies and designated investment firms. 
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4.2.  The Conflict of Interest Due to the Government Officials’  
Presence on the Board 
Since long it is recognised that a central banker should be independent of the fiscal 
dominance, especially in an operational sense, but at the same time it should be strictly 
accountable in terms of its objectives. Most of the countries have therefore streamlined 
their legislative frameworks in a way that the role of the government in monetary policy 
making is eliminated. It is quite possible that the directions from government may 
undermine the monetary policy for the achievement of its short-term designs, which may 
be in conflict with the monetary policy objectives. In order to close the doors for such 
potential exercises, most of the governments through explicit legislation have 
discouraged the presence of government representatives in the monetary policy decision 
making process. In case of any such presence, the voting rights are not granted to the 
government official, but his (her) presence is meant for the provision of information on 
the fiscal side. For example, in the case of the BoE, a treasury representative is allowed to 
sit in the meetings to discuss policy issues, but is not allowed to vote. The purpose is for 
the MPC to be fully briefed about the fiscal developments. 
As can be seen from Table 1, column (a), in majority of the standard monetary 
policy cases there are no government officials on the central banks excluding Pakistan, 
which does not seem to be in conformity with the relevant statutes in Pakistan. For 
instance, Section 9.2.C of the SBP Act (1956, p.9) clearly states that ―those appointed to 
the Board shall have no conflict of interest with the business of the Bank‖. The presence 
of government officials on the board undermines the credibility of the central bank, and 
hence, the effectiveness can be achieved in monetary policy communications. The central 
banks in turn are not able to effectively anchor inflation expectations to maintain price 
stability.  
In order to minimise the direct involvement of the government in central bank 
affairs, many countries have also designed the term structure of their boards and 
governors in a way that it is longer than the term of the governments per se. As can be 
observed from Table 1, columns (c) and (d), with a few exceptions including Pakistan, 
the term of the central bank‘s board members and governors is higher than the terms of 
the elected political parties in their respective countries. 
Such legislative arrangement potentially frees the board members and the 
governor of the worries of reappointment. They are then in a better position to formulate 
the monetary policy more independently to achieve medium to long-term price stability, 
instead of pursuing government‘s short-term objectives that may not necessarily be 
beneficial for the society. It is also pertinent to mention that for better results, these 
countries have explicitly provisioned in their respective statutes for the accountability of 
their central banks (see Table 1, column (f)). If such provisions are not in place, there 
would be no pressure on the board and the governor to conduct monetary policy in the 
best possible manner to yield better results. Holding the central bank accountable for 
price stability is indispensable for better functioning of the SBP. It will lead to improve 
the inflation performance of the SBP, and will help in credibility build-up to enhance the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and its communication. 
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Table 1 
Central Bank Laws and Practices: Policy Types 
Country 
Government 
Officials on 
Board 
Final 
Authority 
Term of 
Members 
Term of 
Governor/ 
Chairman 
Proportion of 
Policy Board 
Appointed by 
Govern- 
ment 
Statutory 
Accountability of 
the Board/ 
Committee for 
Inflation Targets/ 
Price Stability 
Governor/ 
Chairman/and 
Deputy 
Governors 
(PhDs or not) 
(See note below) ( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d ) ( e ) ( f ) ( g ) 
Australia 1 g 5 7 1 Yes Yes 
Belgium 0 g 6 5 1 Yes Yes 
Canada 
0 
b(1967-) 
g(1967+) 
3 7 12/14 
Yes Yes 
France 0 g 6 U 12/13 Yes Yes 
Italy 0 g 3 3 1 Yes Yes 
Netherlands 0 g 7 7 1 Yes Yes 
Sweden 0 g 3 3 1 Yes Yes 
United Kingdom 0 g 4 5 1 Yes Yes 
Japan 0 b 4 4 1 Yes Yes 
United States 0 b 14 (N) 4 10/21 Yes Yes 
Germany 0 b 8 8 1/5 Yes Yes 
Switzerland 0 b 4 8 1 Yes Yes 
New Zealand 0 g 5 5 1 Yes Yes 
India 1 g 4 4 1 Yes Yes 
Pakistan 1 g 3 3 1 No No 
Source: Bade and Parkin (1988) and author‘s search from central bank‘s websites. 
Notes: (a)  number of (or their representatives) who sit on bank board. 
(b)  b = bank;  g = government. 
(c)  years (N = not eligible for re-election). 
(d)  u = unlimited term. 
(e)  number represents proportion of members appointed directly or indirectly by the government . 
 
4.3.  The Conflict of Interest Due to Board Member’s Market Affiliation 
Given the sensitivity and demanding nature of the job, almost all the 
governments make sure that extremely competent and capable people are appointed 
on the boards of central banks. Normally, the board members including the governor 
are high profile specialists from academia or research organisations with 
demonstrated research excellence. Such appointments on one hand, allow mitigation 
of the conflict of interest, and on the other, ensure rational and long-lasting beneficial 
monetary policy decisions. The appropriate conduct of monetary policy requires an 
in-depth research base to be able to comprehend, understand and apply advancements 
in the knowledge, while taking policy decisions. Moreover, the board has to be 
technically sound as in some cases it has to review the performance of the bank as 
well as the governor. For instance in case of New Zealand, the RBNZ Act, 1989 on 
its page 50 Section 53 (1) binds the Board to (a)  keep under constant review the 
performance of the bank in carrying out: 
(i) Its primary function; and (ii) its functions relating to promoting the maintenance 
of a sound and efficient financial system; and (iii) its other functions under this Act 
or any other enactment: (b) keep under constant review the performance of the 
Governor in discharging the responsibilities of that office: (c) keep under constant 
review the performance of the Governor in ensuring that the Bank achieves the 
policy targets agreed to with the Minister under Section 9 or Section 12(7)(b). 
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In case of Pakistan, however, contrary to the prevailing best practices across the 
globe, positions of the Board members including the Governor do not seem to be filled 
with eminent professionals in the field of Economics with terminal qualifications and 
high research profiles. Such appointments on one hand, allow a leeway for inefficient 
conduct of monetary policy and on the other hand, for the potential conflict of interest. 
For example, one of the current Board members has an explicit affiliation with a 
corporate financial and advisory house in the country. He has worked with various 
commercial banks being regulated by the SBP, hence pointing towards a potential 
conflict of interest issue. Similarly, another Board member has affiliation with a firm 
providing consultations in the realm of banking, mergers and acquisitions, corporate and 
financial restructuring, and Islamic modes of financing. The conduct of such activities, 
although in private capacity is somehow indicative of the conflict of interest, when 
viewed in light of the business of the SBP. Notwithstanding, the governor is not an 
economist, a non-specialist and is affiliated with the banking sector, which again is in 
clear conflict with the statutes. Such appointments to the Board, where potential conflict 
of interests are involved need to be avoided, in case it may adversely affect the credibility 
and the effective functioning of the SBP. 
 
5.  DISCLOSURES AND PUBLIC ECONOMIC INFORMATION 
Given the fact that public demands transparency from public institutions and that 
information increase the expected utility of decision makers [Blackwell (1953); Issing 
(2005, p. 67)] asserts: 
A central bank should be well advised and even be legally obliged to publish all 
internal documents and data, in particular those that are instrumental in its monetary 
policy decisions and relate to its status of independence. Such obligations of 
accountability would then also encompass information regarding the decision 
making process itself, any differences of opinion, consensus agreements, a majority 
voting behaviour, etc.  
The subsequent sub-sections assess the existing level of transparency and efficacy 
of public disclosures and economic information of the SBP. 
 
5.1. Disclosure of Profiles, Minutes and Voting Records of the Board 
With increasing transparency, proper disclosure is one of the increasing central 
banking practices. The disclosure of the profiles of board members, minutes of the 
meetings of the board, voting records, and in some cases even the transcripts are released 
for public consumption. The FeD, the BoE, RBNZ, Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey are a few glaring examples amongst others. Although, no consensus has been 
reached yet as to what constitute the optimal way of disclosure. Central banks today are 
more open and transparent, and are continuously in the quest to achieve the best possible 
standards. 
Modern central banks share detailed profiles of monetary policy authorities as well 
as minute details of how they reached on certain policy decision(s) with the public. 
Nevertheless, exceptions such as SBP do exist where detailed profiles of the SBP‘s Board 
may not be tracked to determine, if the government has chosen eminent professionals 
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capable of discharging the important responsibility of the conduct of monetary policy to 
foster public‘s confidence. The SBP only display their names, photos and dates of their 
respective terms on the official website. Since, this opaqueness is in sharp contrast to the 
spirit of transparency which potentially undermines the SBP‘s credibility.  
Like the disclosure of the detailed profiles of the board members, publication of 
detailed minutes of their meetings is equally important. In many countries the monetary 
policy decisions are taken by a committee/board. The minutes of such meetings give 
valuable insights into the arguments raised and the underlying considerations that drove 
the policy decisions [Geraats (2005)]. Advanced countries central banks such as the FeD, 
the BoE, Bank of Japan and ECB publish minutes to help the public develop a better 
understanding of the monetary policy implementation strategy, and predictability of 
monetary policy actions. 
 The SBP initiated publication of the minutes of the then MPC in November, 2009, 
however discontinued the practice in January 2011. The publication of the minutes has 
been resumed since January 2014 which might be due to encouragement by the IMF, 
while being in the programme in this period. The minutes of the Advisory Committee on 
Monetary Policy (ACMP) and the Board have been made available on the SBP‘s official 
website; however, these are as brief as one and a half pages. It does not provide sufficient 
information to understand the underlying motivation (justification) in favour of or against 
a particular monetary policy decision, hence compromises the very spirit of the 
publication of minutes. 
As is practiced in the advanced countries, the monetary authorities go to great 
lengths to elaborate their thinking and decisions, which is reflected in minutes. They 
provide a full account of the policy discussions along with the differences in points of 
view. Such minutes are normally made available within a week or two after the meeting. 
Greater publicity of information reduces the costs of the market of being informed and 
helps intensify the debate about the way the policy decisions are made. It also makes it 
easier for the public to check the outcomes against intentions [Goodfriend (1986)].      
Since there is no consensus as to what should ideally be the length of such 
minutes, streamlining this exercise in line with the international standard practices and 
acknowledging communication of minutes, and voting records as a part of the SBP‘s 
monetary policy communication strategy may be helpful. Of course that would first 
require a clear and well drafted, communication and disclosure policy in light of the 
recent research on transparency and practices of other central banks. Besides, publication 
of voting records could also add to the effectiveness of monetary policy communications. 
Further, the availability of transcripts of the important monetary policy related meetings 
could strengthen the credibility of the SBP. 
 
5.2. Forecasts 
Publication of the central bank forecasts gives the public and private sectors an 
understanding of the central bank‘s perception of the macroeconomic outlook, 
stochastic shocks, preferences, [Chortareas, et al. (2002)] as well as the future state of 
the economy. High levels of transparency in terms of information disclosure reduces 
information asymmetries that leads to effective conduct of the monetary policy and 
enhances market efficiency—because the market can better evaluate the risks and 
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therefore may take informed (optimal) decisions. Cornand and Heinemann (2008) 
noted that not only the market responds to central banks‘ signals but assigns it more 
weight than is justified by its informational content. This might be due to the 
superiority of the central bank information over the private sector [see Romer and 
Romer (2000) for empirical evidence]. 
Given that the public information is welfare enhancing both for the public and  the 
private sectors [Morris and Shin (2002)], utmost effort should be made to attain the 
highest possible levels of precision as well as publicity. This is important not only for 
welfare enhancing reasons, but also for the reason that at the same time such disclosures 
may harm instead, if the expectations are coordinated away from the fundamentals 
[Amato, et al. (2002)]. As argued by Hayat (2014d) and can be inferred from the 
discussion in the current paper that Pakistan‘s overall monetary policy framework does 
not support a forward looking approach, but the SBP does publish projections of 
macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, CPI inflation, money supply (M2), workers‘ 
remittances, exports, imports, current account deficit, and fiscal deficit in its quarterly 
reports mainly covering a one year period. Some of these projections are model based 
forecasts such as CPI inflation, exports and imports. However, for the rest of the 
projections the mechanism is not clear.
15
 
Other than the appearance of the projections of key variables in the quarterly 
reports, normally a one year projection for inflation appears in MPS.  Since, a forward 
looking monetary policy mainly focuses on medium to long-term path of inflation, 
development of sophisticated DSGE models, GTAP, structural and nonlinear VAR 
models as well as ARDL models may be a useful exercise to start with and publish 
medium to long-term forecasts accordingly.  
It is however important to note that due to the scarcity of quality human resources, 
highly equipped with sophisticated skills that can solely be dedicated to do the job (see 
next section for a brief discussion on this point). The SBP may not start publication of 
reliable medium to long-term forecasts unless serious measures are taken to retain, 
encourage and acquire quality human resources, such as PhDs to enhance the SBP‘s 
performance. This nevertheless is a structural issue, which requires a change in the mind-
set of the SBP‘s top, upper and lower tier management. The SBP‘s job is mainly 
operational and its conduct does not necessarily require a full-fledged scientific research. 
This static approach has recently led the SBP to lose an incredible number of foreign 
qualified PhDs, having specialised in relevant areas to the SBP‘s functions, as they find 
the incentive structure and work environment outside the SBP, both in government and 
private sectors way more lucrative. 
 
5.3.  MPS and SBP’s Major Publications 
MPS is the major policy document issued by the SBP every six months. The first MPS 
appeared on the SBP website covered the period from July-December, 2005. This document 
gives a brief outlook of the global as well as domestic economy, and announces a monetary 
expansion of 13 percent to achieve the inflation and growth targets of 8 percent and 7 percent, 
respectively. Backward in nature, this MPS mainly discussed trends in sectors and indicators 
 
15It is also pertinent to mention that the practice of publication of these annual projections seems to 
have been discontinued after the second quarterly report for the FY14. 
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such as monetary and credit sector, external sector, and inflation and interest rate indicators. 
Nevertheless, a review of the most recent MPS for the January 2015, a 25 pages document, 
reveals a considerable improvement in terms of coverage and extensiveness of information. It 
discusses, relatively at a greater length, both the global and domestic developments and their 
outlook. It also covers a detailed trend analysis of all the key sectors of the economy such as, 
monetary, fiscal, external and real sectors and informs that the board has decided to reduce the 
SBP policy rate by 100 basis points. 
It is however surprising to note that after the lapse of almost ten years that the 
SBP has started publication of the MPS, its quality needs significant improvement, 
especially in terms of the forward looking element, substantive coherent arguments 
and linkages. Khizar (2015) recently criticized the MPS issued in November, 2015 
stating that: 
The narrative which accompanied the decision is poor as the policy note falls short 
of explaining its rationale. Instead, it reads as a sycophantic review of the glorious 
past. Year-to-date inflation numbers and other macroeconomic statistics are quoted 
but with little attempt to delve into any deeper analysis of their causes and 
impact….The policy note was silent on the global outlook implying that the 
country‘s economy is insulated from global factors…What is the MPS take on the 
pressures on the currency and its linkage to interest rates? How has the decision of 
the US Federal Reserve to raise rates in December impacted the economy? Will this 
hike impact global currencies and commodity prices and what will be its 
consequences on Pakistan‘s trade balance and currency? What is the future outlook 
and how will the policy decision in Pakistan manage these changes? Is the stance 
dovish or hawkish? What is the rationale behind maintaining status quo in the policy 
rate? The policy note is not depicting any leaning and there is nothing to read 
between the lines. This may imply that the central bank is either, short of good staff 
to set the policy or the lack of interest of the institution in spelling out, a meaningful 
policy note…. 
Improvement might not be possible unless a reasonable resource base is attained 
both in terms of human resources as well as technology.
16
 For example, there are only a 
few PhDs in the monetary policy department as well as the entire SBP, which does not 
allow a thorough and robust research on bits and pieces to help provide meat for the 
MPS. On a head count, there are only five PhDs in the monetary policy department 
including the director, which is less than the Economics Department of the Institute of 
Business Administration (IBA).
17
 The total number of the PhDs in the entire SBP is not 
even half the number of PhDs with specialisation in Economics and Finance in the 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE). The acute scarcity of quality 
human resource in the SBP is also evident from both the quality and quantity of the 
research outputs available on its website.
18
  Further, one may hardly find references of the 
 
16In terms of technology, for example, in addition to the EViews, the provision of commonly used 
fundamental econometric research tools such as MICROFIT, SAS and GTAP, as well as referencing software 
like End Note may be helpful. Acquisition of the LATEX as well the training of the staff on such tools is crucial 
for policy research.  
17The total number of PhDs in the Research Department of the SBP including Director is six. 
18An independent evaluation of the quality and quantity of its policy notes, research outputs and regular 
publications by international specialists in the field may help the SBP to assess its level and efficacy. A similar 
evaluation is conducted by the Bank of Canada [see Meyer, et al. (2008)]. 
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published research, either from the SBP staff or from academia in the SBP‘s major 
publications; such as Quarterly and Annual Reports to support the arguments made 
therein, which is a reflection of the poor quality of these publications. There is only one 
PhD in the SBP‘s relevant department—Economic Policy and Review Department 
(EPRD)—responsible for publication of Quarterly and Annual Reports on the state of the 
economy.
19
  In contrast to this acute dearth of PhDs in the SBP, in the U.S., for example, 
there is a huge resource base even at the staff level with almost 350 PhDs—each one 
having a quality research capability as is reflected by their research profiles and research 
outputs.  
Since, the monetary policy communications such as the MPS are crucial and at the 
same time meant to inform the public to build their confidence—that the monetary policy 
decisions were taken after having developed a thorough understanding of the underlying 
dynamics of the global and domestic economy and the linkages therein. A mere mention 
of the developments in the global economy, say for example in the case of Euro Area, 
Japan and the U.S., may not be sufficient, unless these developments and their potential 
impact could very well be connected to the domestic economy, and then to the goal 
variables. Similarly, a mere mention of the developments and outlook of the important 
sectors of the domestic economy may not constitute a useful central bank communication 
(MPS), unless properly linked together to indicate a support for the particular 
increase/decrease in the policy rate.    
It is also important to connect more objectively (on the back of extensive impact 
analysis), whether the decisions taken previously were translated into the key 
macroeconomic indicators as well as to the goal variables such as, inflation and growth. 
Further, what would be the possible courses taken by the monetary authorities in case of 
any variations in the contemplated global and domestic circumstances as well as 
deviations from the targeted goal variables. Since, the MPS is essentially meant for the 
forthcoming six months period, the document should be able to provide some insights in 
a forward looking manner, while highlighting both the short and medium term 
projections, and the possible impact of the underlying monetary policy decision(s) over 
horizon(s). It should also review if the past decisions have been able to yield the desired 
results in terms of the goal variables, if not, why not and what steps have been taken to 
make the policy more effective?  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
There is a wide agreement that increased transparency in monetary policy decision 
making processes and communication has considerably enhanced central banks‘ 
performances across the globe. Today‘s central banks are in a much better position to 
anchor inflation expectations. This paper critically assesses the state of Pakistan‘s 
monetary policy transformation, in terms of transparency and openness, especially in 
terms of statutory objectives, monetary policy mandate, conflicts of interest, disclosures, 
and dissemination of effective public economic information. 
 
19It is important to highlight that EPRD hardly does any research-based analysis or review of existing 
economic policies as is envisaged by its name. Instead an ex-post backward-looking trend-based analysis of 
various sectors of the economy is provided in its Quarterly and Annual reports.   
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The assessment indicates that the SBP Act, 1956 does not provide any effective 
guiding framework in terms of monetary policy objectives and mandate. The inflation 
and growth targets setting strategy of the government is intrinsically flawed, leading the 
economy away from the path of price stability, which is considered crucial for a 
sustainable economic growth. It does not allow appropriate benchmarks for the monetary 
policy evaluation and accountability. Further, the Act does not put an explicit mechanism 
to insulate against the conflict of interest issues, originating from the dual supervisory 
and monetary policy role of the SBP, market affiliations of  the Members of the Board 
and the Governor as well as fiscal dominance. 
If the SBP has to adapt to the needs of the modern central banking practices, 
serious and constant institutional capacity and credibility building measures will have to 
be taken. This, in the first place requires a change in the static culture of the SBP. 
Implanting qualified human resources at the top, middle and lower tier managerial levels 
could play an instrumental role towards the organisational change.  
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